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Abstract We extend Condorcet’s Jury Theorem (Essai sur l’application de
l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité des voix. De l’im-
primerie royale, 1785) to weighted voting games with voters of two kinds: a fixed
(possibly empty) set of ‘major’ voters with fixed weights, and an ever-increasing
number of ‘minor’ voters, whose total weight is also fixed, but where each indi-
vidual’s weight becomes negligible. As our main result, we obtain the limiting
probability that the jury will arrive at the correct decision as a function of the com-
petence of the few major players. As in Condorcet’s result the quota q = 1/2 is
found to play a prominent role.
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1 Introduction
Condorcet (1785) considers collective decision-making, where the objective is
‘truth-tracking’. The fundamental premise is that there is a unique unanimously
preferred alternative (the ‘truth’), but voters only have partial information and
imperfect competence for detecting it. The probability of a single voter’s choice
being correct is taken to quantify the competence of a voter. Here, the quantity of
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interest is the jury competence of the decision-making body—the probability of
arriving at the correct decision. Condorcet assumes equal individual competence,
greater than 1/2, on a dichotomous choice. Condorcet’s Jury Theorem shows that
under simple majority rule, jury competence approaches one with increasing size
of the group or increasing individual competence. Over the past decades, this cel-
ebrated result has been extended in numerous ways by statisticians, economists,
political scientists, etc.1
The simple majority game as considered by Condorcet is a special case of a
weighted voting game (WVG). Here, each board member is assigned a non-nega-
tive number as weight and a relative quota indicates the fraction of the total weight
required for a win. The aim of this note is to provide a generalization of Condor-
cet’s Jury Theorem to WVGs when the voters are of two kinds: a fixed (possibly
empty) set of major (big) voters with fixed weights, and an ever-increasing num-
ber of minor (small) voters whose total weight is also fixed, but each individual
weight becomes negligible. Using the idea that asymptotically many minor voters
act like a modification of the quota for the vote among major voters,2 the limit-
ing jury competence is derived as a function of the competence of the few major
players (as a group). As in Condorcet’s result, the quota q = 1/2 is found to
play a prominent role. We show that it maximizes the range of values of major
weights for which jury competence converges to infallibility. This covers the case
where major voters are absent, and Condorcet’s original Jury Theorem results as
a by-product.
2 The model
Consider a partition of the set of voters into two camps. The set of major voters
is L = {1, . . . , l}, where l is a natural number.3 Each k ∈ L is assigned a weight
wk , and let wL = ∑k∈L wk ∈ [0, 1] denote the combined voting weight of L .
We shall consider a sequence of WVGs {n}n∈N with a growing population of
minor voters. In each of these games n , the set of n minor voters is denoted by
Mn = {l + 1, . . . , l + n}. For each n, these voters have weights αn1 , . . . , αnn , which
sum up to α = 1 − wL > 0. For any coalition S ⊂ L ∪ Mn we interpret w(S) as
the aggregate voting weight of S.
Formally, the WVG n is described by the tuple
n = [q; w1, . . . , wl , αn1 , . . . , αnn ], (1)
where q ∈ (0, 1] is the relative quota. S is a winning coalition in n iff w(S) ≥ q .
The latter (weak) inequality may be replaced by the strict inequality >. In this case
we change the bracket notation in (1) to 〈 q; w1, . . . , wl , αn1 , . . . , αnn 〉.
1 See e.g., Fey (2003) for references to recent work.
2 Dubey and Shapley (1979) use a similar argument for analyzing asymptotic properties of
the Banzhaf index.
3 Note that l = 0 takes care of the case where L is empty by the general convention that
{1, . . . , 0} is empty.
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Put αnmax := maxk≤n αnk and Qn :=
∑
k≤n
[
αnk
]2
. Let {n}n∈N evolve in such
a way that
lim
n→∞ α
n
max/
√
Qn = 0, (2)
which ensures αnmax → 0 as n → ∞.4
3 A generalization of Condorcet’s Jury Theorem
In a jury trial, assume a given a priori probability θ ∈ [0, 1] that the defendant is
guilty of the offense charged. This models the existence of a truth independent of
the jury, yet unknown to its members. Each jury member (voter) k is assumed to
possess a more or less reliable perception about the truth. This degree of knowl-
edge is modeled by pk ∈ (0, 1), the judgemental competence of voter k. It is the
probability that the voter will make the correct choice between the options ‘guilty’
or ‘not guilty’. Assume the minor voters’ choices are independent of one another
and that a common p ∈ (0, 1) exists, the probability of any minor voter making
the correct decision. Hence we put pk = p for all k ∈ Mn .
Jury competence is measured by the likelihood of the verdict being correct.
Let CI [] denote the probability of conviction, provided the defendant is guilty.
Analogously, let CI I [] denote the probability of acquittal in case of innocence.
Jury competence then follows as
C[] = θCI [] + (1 − θ)CI I []. (3)
For the moment put θ = 1, so that C[] = CI [] (the defendant is guilty). In
the sequence of games {n}n∈N, we should expect that in the limit the continuous
‘ocean’ of randomly voting minor voters will be divided in such a way that the
aggregate voting weight for conviction (the correct choice) is pα. Consider the
games
0 = [q − pα;w1, . . . , wl ] and ′0 = 〈q − pα;w1, . . . , wl〉, (4)
which are well-defined for q ∈ J (p) := (pα,wL + pα). 0 and ′0 can be con-
sidered limiting WVGs for the major players where the aggregate minor weight
pα in favor of conviction is substracted from the quota q .
Let Bl = [wL ; w1, w2, . . . , wl ] denote the unanimity game among the major
voters in which each voter has a veto. Let B∗l = 〈0; w1, w2, . . . , wl〉 represent
the special case where the major voters operate under what Rae (1969) has called
a ‘rule of individual initiative’: action (conviction) can be initiated by any single
individual. We will show that in the sequence of games {n}n∈N, CI converges to a
limit depending on the quota q and wL . Figure 1 gives an illustration for p > 1/2.
Within the inner triangle J (p), the limit is the arithmetic mean of CI for the games
defined in (4). Outside the closure of J (p), the influence of the major voters is
‘destroyed’.
4 However, it can be shown that Qn tends to zero so that condition (2) is stronger than
αnmax → 0.
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CI → 1 CI → 0
J (p)
CI → 12CI [Γ0] + 12CI [Γ0]
CI → 12CI [Bl]CI → 12 (1 + CI [B∗l ])
Fig. 1 Limit scenario for CI
For θ = 0 (the defendant is innocent) we have C[] = CI I []. Since voting
for acquittal is now correct, minor voters vote for conviction with probability 1− p.
The limit scenario of CI I follows analogously to CI by replacing p by (1 − p)
and putting CI I = 1 − CI . The resulting graph for CI I is homeomorphic to that
in Fig. 1. The inner triangle J (1 − p) is however shifted to the left.
Theorem 1 (A Generalization of Condorcet Jury Theorem to WVGs) In the
sequence of WVGs {n}n∈N, the limiting jury competence is a function of the
competence of the few major voters. In particular, jury competence converges to
lim
n→∞ C[
n] = θCI + (1 − θ)CI I , (5)
where CI is given by
CI = 12CI [0] +
1
2
CI [′0], if q ∈ J (p). (6)
For other values of q, the right-hand side of (6) simplifies to
CI =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1 if q < pα,
1/2 (1 + CI [B∗l ]) if q = pα,
1/2 CI [Bl ] if q = wL + pα,
0 if q > wL + pα.
(7)
CI I is obtained by replacing p in (6) and (7) by 1 − p and putting CI I = 1 − CI .
Proof The proof of Theorem 1 is available upon request. The main idea of the
proof is as follows. Since we assume that the minor voters’ choices are indepen-
dent of one another, the aggregate voting weight of any coalition of minor voters is
interpreted as a sum of independent random variables. This allows us to analyze the
asymptotic properties of jury competence by means of a generalized central limit
theorem, the Lindeberg–Feller theorem [see e.g., Theorem 4.7 in Petrov (1995)
p. 123]. This method is valid as long as the weights of the minor voters are not
too skewed, which is guaranteed by condition (2). The asymptotic behavior of
jury competence begins to manifest itself at around 20 minor players. Estimates
of convergence rates are available upon request. Figure 2 gives an illustration of
Theorem 1. unionsq
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C → θ C → 1 − θC → 1
q ∈ J (p) ∩ J (1 − p)
Fig. 2 Generalized Jury Theorem
In the triangle-shaped area around q = 1/2 jury competence converges to
infallibility, C = 1, for lower values of wL . Note that it contains the point marked
with ‘*’ on the horizontal wL = 0 (absence of major voters) and q = 1/2. The
simple majority rule, as considered by Condorcet, is a special case of this setting
in which the block of votes, α = 1, is broken up and divided equally among an
ever-increasing number of minor voters.
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